The relationship between income inequality, poverty and globalisation by Heshmati, Almas
 



	

		

  

		

	 !" #
$		

Heshmati, A. 
  
	
 1


	


	

	

		

 
Almas Heshmati 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and 
MTT Economic Research 
Luutnantintie 13 
FIN-00410 Helsinki, Finland 
Phone: +358-9-56086213 
Fax:     +358-9-56086264 
E-mail: Almas.Heshmati@mtt.fi 
 
August 20, 2004 
 

This paper introduces two composite indices of globalisation. The first is based on the 
Kearney/Foreign Policymagazine and the second is obtained from principal component 
analysis. They indicate the level of globalisation and show how globalisation has 
developed over time for different countries. The indices are composed of four 
components: economic integration, personal contact, technology and political 
engagement, each generated from a number of indicators. A breakdown of the index 
into major components provides possibilities to identify sources of globalisation at the 
country level and associate it with economic policy measures. The empirical results 
show that a low rank in the globalisation process is due to political and personal factors 
with limited possibility for the developing countries to affect. The high ranked 
developed countries share similar patterns in distribution of various components. The 
indices were also used in a regression analysis to study the causal relationships between 
income inequality, poverty and globalisation. Inequality is negatively correlated to 
globalisation, and globalisation reduces poverty.  
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∗ An earlier version of this paper was completed while I was working at the World Institute for 
Development Economic Research, UNU/WIDER. I am grateful to Motasam Tatahi for his valuable 
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.  
 2
+,
		

Globalisation1 has become a way to describe changes in international economy and in 
world politics. It is defined as the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital 
across borders. Globalisation is a result of reduced transportation and communication 
costs, lower trade barriers, faster communication, rising capital flows, increased 
competition, standardization, and migration to mention a few key causal factors. The 
process has brought the developed economies closer together and made them more 
strongly interrelated. In the new era of growing integration of economies and societies, 
individuals and corporations reach around the world further, faster, and more 
economically than before. This subjects states and individuals to more intense 
developed market forces by causing rapid changes in trade relations, financial flows, 
and the mobility of labour across the world. However, there is a large heterogeneity in 
the degree of the process of globalisation over time and across countries and regions and 
also within countries. This heterogeneity causes disparity in development, especially in 
the negative effects such as rising inequality within and between countries, and urges 
the need to find the sources of disparity and the quantification of its magnitude and 
impacts on the living conditions of the world population. 
In recent years, theoretical research on the link between globalisation and world 
inequality and poverty has been intense. However, analysis of the link at the empirical 
level is scarce. Globalisation generally is expected to reduce poverty through faster 
growth in more integrated economies. Extensive empirical research on the causal 
connections between globalisation and inequality in developing nations during the pre-
globalisation phase show that there is no structural relationship between growth and 
inequality, and income inequality levels were generally immobile and trendless. Despite 
the great importance that in recent decade is placed on the globalisation process, its 
sources and consequences remain poorly understood. The channels through which 
globalisation affect world inequality have been identified as commodity price 
equalisation, factor price convergence, capital mobility and differentials in marginal 
products and rates of return of capital among countries, and dynamic convergence in per 
capita income growth.  
The objective of this study is to investigate the usefulness of two indices of 
globalisation (Kearney and principal component analysis based) to compare a large 
sample of industrialised, transition and developing countries by their integration in the 
world economy. The two indices each are based on the countries’ economic integration, 
personal contact, technology and political engagement. A decomposition of the indices 
into underlying components quantifies the individual factors’ contribution to the 
integration. In addition to investigating the international level of globalisation, the 
indices are used for between and within region comparisons. The indices are expected to 
serve as useful tools in the evaluation of the impact of globalisation on the welfare of 
nations and regions. They are used in regression analysis to study the causal relationship 
between income inequality, poverty and globalisation.  
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the literature on different 
perspectives on globalisation, the links between globalisation and inequality and 
poverty, and measures to reduce its negative impacts is reviewed. In Section 3 the 
                                                           
1 Sklair (1999) and Woods (1998) discuss competing conceptions, main approaches to, definitions, 
debates and implications of globalization.  
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Kearney and principal component composite indices of globalisation is introduced. The 
data is described in Section 4. Results on variations in the two globalisation indices, 
ranking of countries and regions by degrees of globalisation and development of 
globalisations over time is discussed in Section 5. Results from regression analyses of 
the impacts of globalisation on income inequality and poverty are discussed in Section 6 
and 7, respectively. Section 8 summarises the findings.      
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Globalisation has its roots in the second half of the eighteenth century. The period 1870 
to 2000 is classified into: the first wave of globalisation 1870-1913, the de-globalisation 
period of 1913-1950, the golden age of 1950-1973, and the second wave of 
globalisation of 1973 onwards (see O’Rourke and Williamson 2000¸ O’Rourke 2001; 
Maddison 2001; Williamson 2002; and World Bank Development Research Group 
2002). The empirical evidence shows that during the first wave of globalisation 
convergence in per capita income and real wages took place within the Atlantic 
economy. The de-globalisation period is characterized as a widening disparity between 
the richest and the poorest regions, and within the Atlantic economy. The golden age 
was a period of rapid growth, relative stability and declining inequality. For more 
details see Solimano (2001).  
A literature on various aspects of the recent wave of globalisation is developing. Several 
special issues on globalisation have been published in Oxford Development Studies, 
Journal of World-Systems Research and Journal of African Economies. Editorial 
introduction to these special issues are provided by Woods (1998), Manning (1999), 
Bata and Bergesen (2002a, 2002b), and Bevan and Fosu (2003). In addition, a number 
of books on the issue have been published by the academic press. Dollar and Collier 
(2001) and the World Bank Development Research Group (2002) explored the 
relationship between globalisation, growth and poverty; James (2002) analysed 
technology, globalisation and poverty, while Aghion and Williamson (1998) examined 
the relationship between globalisation, growth and inequality, focusing on history and 
policies. Khan and Riskin (2001) studied the globalisation, growth, inequality and 
poverty issues but limited their study to the development in China. O’Rourke and 
Williamson (2000) look at the evolution of the 19th century Atlantic economy, and 
Tousch and Herrmann (2002) analysed globalisation and European integration. 
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In recent years, research on the link between globalisation and world inequality has 
been intense. Economic growth has often been given priority as an anti-poverty 
measure, while the negative links between growth and inequality have been largely 
ignored by policy makers. Cornia and Court (2001), in a policy brief covering the 
second wave of globalisation, highlight five main issues. First, inequality has risen since 
the early-mid 1980s. Second, the traditional common factors causing inequality, such as 
land concentration, urban bias and inequality in education, are not responsible for 
worsening the situation. Third, the persistence of inequality at high levels makes 
poverty reduction difficult. Fourth, a high level of inequality can depress the rate of 
growth and have undesirable political and social impacts (see also Birdsall, 2000). Fifth, 
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developments in Canada and Taiwan show that low inequality can be maintained at a 
fast growth rate.  
The non-traditional new causes of inequality are identified as liberal economic policy 
regimes and the way in which economic reform policies have been carried out. Land 
reform, expanding education and active regional policy are recommended as measures 
to reduce inequality. The new development approach called the ‘Post-Washington 
Consensus’ (Stiglitz, 1998) includes measures to offset the impacts of new technologies 
and trade, macroeconomic stability, careful financial liberalization and regulation, 
equitable labour market policies, and innovative tax and transfer policies.  
In their studies of the link between globalisation and inequality, Lindert and Williamson 
(2001) and O’Rourke (2001) state that increased world inequality has been driven by 
between-country rather than within-country inequality. It follows that globalisation will 
have very different implications for within-country inequality. The direction of impact 
on within-country inequality depends on the participating country’s policy to exploit it. 
The source of within-country inequality could be poor government and non-democracy 
in lagging countries, not globalisation.2 Lindert and Williamson (2001) classified the 
influence of globalisation on inequality in five conclusions. First, the widening income 
gaps between countries that integrated into the world economy have probably been 
reduced. Second, within labour-abundant countries, emigration and opening up to 
international trade before 1914 lowered inequality. Third, within labour-scarce 
countries, immigration and opening up to international trade raised inequality. Fourth, 
accounting for all international and intra-national effects, more globalisation has 
reduced inequality. Fifth, inequality is lower under integration of countries and 
economies than under segmentation.  
Talbot (2002), in view of the unequal exchange in the world system, argues that a new 
international inequality exists that has been superimposed on the old form of 
international inequality, which explains increasing global inequality. Talbot refers to the 
case of coffee production and trans-national corporations’ control over the capital. Bata 
and Bergesen (2002) summarize that the increasing international inequality was one of 
the most important consequences of the nineteenth century globalisation. They further 
state that research into the cause of increasing inequalities is important; understanding 
how the world-system works and the consequences of globalisation in the twentieth 
century is necessary in order to change it. Babones (2002) find increasing between-
nation inequality since mid twentieth century. Beer and Boswell (2002) link increased 
within-nation inequality to greater dependency on foreign investment. Ciccantell and 
Bunker (2002) argue for reorganization of the world-system in support of Japanese 
developments such as organization and technological innovations in the steel industry. 
Bornschier (2002) noted stable inequality until 1972, but increasing both within- and 
between-nation inequality until the end of the century. Bergesen and Bata (2002) find 
that within- and between-nation inequality change together over time among core 
countries, but they are unrelated among non-core countries.      
                                                           
2 See also Aghion and Williamson (1998) on the link between wage and income inequality and growth in 
developed economies.  
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Agénor (2003) examines the extent to which globalisation affects the poor in 
developing countries. The focus is on the channels through which trade openness and 
financial integration may have adverse effect on poverty. Cross-country regression 
analysis relates globalisation to poverty and control for various macroeconomic and 
structural variables. Results suggest evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship 
between globalisation and poverty indicating that globalisation at low (higher) levels 
tends to increase (reduce) poverty. Collier and Dollar (2001) estimate that poverty in the 
developing countries will decline by about one-half by 2015. The reduction is 
conditional on the 1990s trend to holds, improved aid effectiveness in lagging regions, 
the quality of economic policy, and significant policy reforms in these countries to 
create a better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid. Inefficiency in aid 
makes achievements of the poverty reduction goals uncertain. In a comparison of actual 
aid allocation and poverty-efficient aid allocation Collier and Dollar (2002) found that 
the level of poverty and quality of policies matter. The results are not sensitive to 
poverty measures, but the authors find a systematic difference between the actual and 
poverty-efficient aid allocations.  
The World Bank Development Research group (2002) focuses on the impact of 
economic integration on the poor people living in developing countries. Three main 
findings linked to the debates about globalisation are presented. First, poor countries 
like China, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam, which were early exporters of primary 
commodities, have broken into the global market for manufacturing and services, 
lowering their poverty. Second, efforts have increased to include countries like 
Afghanistan and Congo into the world economy. Third, standardization or cultural and 
institutional homogenization result from the economic integration. In sum, the 
economic integration has supported poverty reduction, but inclusiveness should be 
improved to not bypass marginalized and new globaliser countries (see also Dollar and 
Collier (2001) and Khan and Riskin (2001)). The World Bank Development Research 
Group presents a seven-point plan to help developing countries take better advantage of 
the benefits of globalisation and manage the risks associated with their integration into 
the world economy.3 
Yusuf (2003) lists a number of factors as a source of growth relevant to both poor and 
rich countries. These are labour, human capital, research and development investment, 
technological progress and increase in total factor productivity rising from scale 
economies, agglomeration effects, externalities and institutions that secure rights and 
minimise transaction costs. Increase in welfare in developing countries will depend on 
their policies addressing these variables. Concerning globalisation in Africa, Ajayi 
(2003) reaches the conclusion that integration into the global economy alone does not 
enhance growth, but also maintenance of macroeconomic stability, high 
investment/GDP ratios and development of human capital, infrastructure and 
                                                           
3 The seven-point plan are: (i) a ‘Development Round’ of trade talks to bring down the trade barriers, (ii) 
improving the investment climate in developing countries to encourage inflows of foreign direct 
investment, (iii) improving delivery of education and health services to enable the poor to benefit from 
growth, (iv) provide social protection to a changing labour market to enable workers to take more risks 
and to avail themselves of new opportunities, (v) rich nations should increase foreign aid with impact on 
growth and poverty, (vi) support debt relief for reforms in marginalized countries, and (vii) tackling 
greenhouse gases which has been burdensome to poor countries and poor people.    
 6
institutions are also necessary.  Mussa (2003) gives an overview of the challenges posed 
to the international community by globalisation with emphasis on the economic issues 
of the distribution of benefits accruing from increased trade and the reduction of the 
effects of instabilities in international capital flows.     
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Globalisation has other dimensions than inequality and poverty with different impacts 
and can be looked at from different perspectives. James (2002) analyses the causes of 
globalisation in terms of transaction costs and focuses on information and 
communication technologies as well as technical change and foreign investment 
deriving from globalisation and their application to developing problems in Africa. 
Bhagwati (2000) focuses on trade and foreign direct investment. Appropriate 
governance is needed to manage globalisation and the speed at which it must be 
pursued. La Porta et al.’s (1999) examination shows that from the perspective of 
promoting development the performance and quality of government across countries 
varies in systematic ways. Milanovic (2002) show that the effects of openness on 
income distribution depend on the country’s initial income level. Seshanna and 
Decornez (2003) find that during the last 40 years the world economy has become 
wealthier, more globally integrated, but unequal and polarized. Mahler (2001) found 
little evidence of a systematic relationship between any of the three main modes of 
economic globalisation (trade, foreign direct investment and financial openness) and 
either the distribution of disposable income or earnings of households in developed 
countries.  
Several studies address the wage links between globalisation and inequality within a 
country. The effects of globalisation on skill premium, unemployment, and countries’ 
social policies are addressed by Ethier (2002). Empirical literature concludes that trade 
has played a smaller role in the rise of skill premium than skill-biased technical change. 
Miller (2001) demonstrates that globalisation explains a significant increase in earnings 
inequality from declining relative wages of unskilled workers in the US since the late 
1970s. Eckel (2003) shows that changes in relative wages are independent of wage 
rigidities, but wage inequality is affected by capital market integration. Manasse and 
Turrini (2001) study the effects of globalisation on income inequality by looking at 
trade integration. Globalisation, although improving welfare, is likely to raise 
inequality. Redistribution, rather than protection, should be the appropriate measure to 
avoid a rise in inequality.     
		
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Countries could use a number of measures to reduce the negative impacts of the rapid 
globalisation process. The current system is incapable of dealing with the surfacing 
problems. Nayyar and Court (2002) identify the main ways in which the governance 
needs of the world economy and policy can be strengthened. A new structure of 
governance, reforms and new institutions are proposed to better protect the interests of 
poorer developing countries. Addison and Rahman (2002) identify geographical 
characteristics, institutional and political factors, economic policy and histories that 
matter for an individual country’s capacity to globalize. Bordo et al. (1999) conclude 
that commercial and financial integration before the First World War was more limited 
but trade tensions and financial instability have not worsened in recent years; 
institutional innovations and their stabilizing role explain this. Regarding the 
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importance of institutional capacity for globalisation and openness Chirathivat and 
Murshed (2001) argue that domestic institutional capacities in Southeast Asia were 
inadequate to cope with the influx of capital necessary to prevent the recent Asian 
economic crisis.  
Recent literature on economic geography considers globalisation as the catalyst for 
structural change (Peri, 2002). Decreases in transport costs trigger the emergence of 
agglomeration economies and a source of within country inequality. Transportation 
plays a dualistic role as a pro-active agent of globalisation and as a beneficiary of its 
development. However, regional inequalities limit globalisation opportunities (Janelle 
and Beuthe, 1997). The growth of the information technology service sector (Zagler, 
2003) affects productivity growth, and inequality within and between countries. Pieterse 
(2000) argues that globalisation involves a trend towards human integration. In line with 
Sen (2002) the concern in Ravallion (2003) is continuing deprivation and rising 
disparity in standards of living  
There is a link between the type of export and inequality. Calderón and Chong (2001) 
find that primary export countries (developing) are associated with an increase in 
inequality, while manufacturing exporters (developed) are linked with decreasing 
inequality. Despite increasing inequality, Mayer (2001) finds that globalisation has 
improved access to new technologies and provides unique opportunities for poor 
countries to raise their incomes, however countries differ in technology upgrading and 
skill accumulation (see also Meyer, 1999). 
Despite limitations in the existing literatures, a majority of empirical studies finds the 
positive impacts of integration overweigh the negative effects. In one of the few critical 
papers Sutcliffe and Glyn (1999) find globalisation widely misinterpreted and its 
quantitative extent and novelty exaggerated. They criticize the research on the basis of 
the use of inappropriate statistical measures, conclusions drawn from limited data, 
failure to make historical comparisons and failure to see counter-globalisation 
tendencies.  
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Kearney (2002, 2003) is the first attempt to construct a database and to compute a 
composite globalisation index. The index is composed of four major components: 
economic integration, personal contact, technology, and political engagement, each 
generated from a number of determinant variables, in total 13. The globalisation index 
(KEARNEY) is based on normalization of individual variables and subsequent 
aggregation using an ad hoc weighting system as follows: 
(1)  ∑ ∑
= =
−−=
 



 
1 1
minmaxmin })/(){(ω   
where 	and 
 indicate country and time periods,  and  are within and between major 
component variables, 
 
ω  are the weights attached to each contributing -variable, min 
and max are minimum and maximum values of respective variables across countries in 
a given year. The index is similar to a commonly used Human Development Index 
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(HDI) which is based on educational attainment, life expectancy and real GDP per 
capita.4  
In calculation of the Kearney index, the component’s weights are chosen on an ad hoc 
basis and are constant across countries and over time. We consider this index a 
benchmark index. In the basic index each of the 13 determinants of the index are given 
equal weight (=1). In the alternative case, a number of variables were given double 
weights (=2). Lockwood (2001) using a smaller set of countries found the ranking of 
countries sensitive to the way the indicators are measured, normalised and weighted.   
There are two alternative approaches to the Kearney index to compute an index of 
globalisation. These are to use principal component (Heshmati 2003) or factor analysis 
(Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003).5 In this paper we adopt the principal component 
(PC) approach.6 PC analysis is a multivariate technique for examining relationships 
within a set of variables consisting of several quantitative variables. Recently, Agénor 
(2003) used trade and financial openness to compute a simple economic globalisation 
index based on PC analysis. 
Given a dataset with  numeric variables, at most  principal components can be 
computed; each is a linear combination of the original variables with coefficients equal 
to the eigenvectors of the correlation of the covariance matrix. The principal 
components are sorted by descending order of the eigenvalues, which are equal to the 
variance of the components. PC analysis can be viewed as a way to uncover 
approximate linear dependencies among variables. This method gives a least square 
solution to the following model: 
(2)   +=    
where  is an × matrix of the centered observed variables,  is the × matrix of 
scores of the first  principal components,  is a  × matrix of eigenvectors,  is an 
× matrix of residuals,  is the number of observations,  is the number of partial 
variables, and   is the number of variables or indicators of globalisation. Here we 
minimize the sum of all the squared residuals, which are measured as distances from the 
point to the (first) principal axis. In the least squares case the vertical distance to the 
fitted line is minimized.  
The globalisation indices indicate the level and state of inequality in globalisation 
among countries and regions. It shows how globalisation has developed for different 
                                                           
4  For a review of the HDI, its components, criticisms on the index and alternative indices see Noorbakhsh 
(1998). 
5 The data underlying the two studies differ with respect to country coverage, period of observation and 
selected indicators of globalization. Heshmati (2003) is based on a panel data containing 13 indicators of 
globalization and 62 industrialised and developing countries observed during 1995-2000, while Anderson 
and Herbertsson (2003) uses data on 9 indicators from 23 OECD countries for the period 1979 to 2000. 
6 A PC procedure performs a PC analysis to produce standardized or unstandardised PC scores. A factor 
analysis (FA) performs PC and common FA with rotations to produce component scores or estimates of 
common factor scores. FA can be used for common factor analysis. The default method is PC. FA 
produces the same results as PC except that scoring coefficients from FA are normalized to give PC 
scores with unit variance. A comparison of results from application of the two methods based on the same 
data would shed lights on their strength and limitations. For a discussion of each method’s advantages 
over the other, see SAS/STAT User's’Guide (SAS Institute 1993).  
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countries over time. A breakdown of the Kearney index into major components 
provides possibilities to identify sources of globalisation. For similar breakdown of the 
PC analysis index can be based on canonical correlation looking at the correlation 
relationship between two or more sets of variables. The indices as shown later can be 
used to study the causal relationship between globalisation and inequality, growth, 
poverty and wages.  


The database created by Kearney/	  magazine (2002, 2003)7 is used for 
computation of the globalisation index. This data is a small balanced panel covering 62 
countries observed for the period 1995-2000, and was originally collected from national 
sources and international organizations and financial institutions. The data variables on 
economic integration, personal contacts, technology, and political engagement are 
expected to proxy the channels through which globalisation affect economic growth, 
and world inequality and poverty.  
The data on economic integration consists of four variables: trade, foreign direct 
investment, portfolio capital flows, and income payments and receipts. All four 
variables are given as a share of GDP. The trade variable includes total trade and is 
measured as the sum of goods and services. FDI is measured as an aggregate of in- and 
outflows of FDI. Portfolio flows is measured as the sum of portfolio inflows and 
outflows. Income payments and receipts include the compensation of non-resident 
employees and income earned and paid on assets held abroad. 
The second component on personal contact consists of three variables: international 
telephone traffic, international travel and tourism, and transfer payments and receipts. 
The telephone traffic variable is defined as per capita sum of incoming and outgoing 
calls. The travel and tourism variable is defined as the sum of travellers in and out from 
a country as a share of its population. The receipts of transfers and payments is 
measured as the sum of in- and out-transfer payments as a share of GDP.  
The technology component builds on three variables: internet users, internet hosts and 
secure internet servers. This component is very much internet specific and does not 
reflect technology in a broad meaning. The internet user variable is measured as a share 
of population, while internet hosts and secured servers are measured per capita.  
The last component, political engagement, is based on three variables including the 
number of embassies in the country, number of memberships in international 
organizations, and number of UN Security Council missions undertaken during a 
calendar year.  
The supplementary data include population and GDP variables used for normalisation 
purposes. A summary statistics of the variables is given in Table 1.  
From Table 1 we observe large variations among variables underlying the calculation of 
the index and its components. The distribution of the index components (not reported 
here) is not uniform. This is particularly evident in the case of the technology 
                                                           
7 The data sources can be viewed at web sites: www.foreignpolicy.com and www.atkearney.com.  
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component with large dispersion and with the sample mean significantly higher than the 
median. In the case of the political component the mean and median values overlap. The 
range of principal-component-based indices differs from those of Kearney-based 
indices.  
Correlation coefficients among various index components are presented in Table 2. As 
expected, the various components are positively and mostly significantly correlated 
among themselves. The economic integration component is negatively correlated over 
time, while technology is positively correlated with time. The remaining personal and 
political components as well as the two Kearney globalisation indices are not correlated 
with time. Application of different weights does not change the rank of the countries 
much. The overall Kearney index is much dominated by political and economic 
integration. We have not decomposed the principal component index into its underlying 
four components. Such decomposition would require, first, the application of PC 
analysis on each component separately, and then the aggregation of the components into 
a single globalisation index, or, alternatively, the use of canonical correlation analysis.   

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The Kearney (1) and principal component (2) indices of globalisation are computed for 
each of the 62 countries and for six years of observation. A weighted principal 
component index is obtained by aggregating the first three principal components, where 
in the aggregation their normalised contribution to the explanation of the total variance 
explained is used as weights.8 Following Kearney’s approach a number of economic, 
personal and technology factors are given higher weights. For matters of sensitivity 
analysis the Kearney index as a benchmark model is computed with equal weights as 
well. The summary statistics of the index components are given at the bottom of Table 
1.  
Table 2 reports correlation coefficients among different index components and indices. 
The economic component is decreasing (-0.14) over time, while technology shows an  
increasing trend (0.12). The personal and economic components are highly correlated 
(0.59). Unlike the Kearney indices, the principal component indices indicate that 
globalisation process is increasing over time (0.24 and 0.29, respectively). The within 
group correlation among the two Kearney indices is high (0.99), as well as among the 
two PC indices (0.84). The between index group correlation coefficients are also quite 
high (0.77-0.88). 
	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The mean of the four globalisation indices by country together with the period mean 
Gini coefficient and most recent years of Gini coefficient are reported in Table 3A. The 
countries are ranked in descending order of the first principal component index. 
However, for matters of comparison, the rank numbers by the weighted Kearney index 
are also given in the same table. The rank of countries by degree of globalisation differs 
somewhat by the computation method chosen. The transition in position of the least 
                                                           
8 For the principal component analysis we identified three eigenvalues exceeding one; 4.5862, 2.6419 and 
1.3622. The proportion of the total variance explained by these principal components are: 0.3528, 0.2032 
and 0.1048. The cumulative proportion of total variance explained is 0.6608.  
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globalised countries is higher than that of the most globalised ones. Ideally one should 
report the transition steps over time for the selected index in the form of a transition 
matrix.  
The results based on the first principal component show that Uganda, Iran and Morocco 
are ranked as the three least globalised countries compared to Ireland, Singapore and 
Switzerland which rank as the most globalised countries. Slovenia, Slovak republic and 
Nigeria are among the average globalised countries. Internal and external conflicts seem 
to effectively reduce the low ranked countries’ globalisation process by affecting the 
economic and technology components negatively. The high ranked countries with few 
exceptions share similar patterns in the various components distribution. Several 
exceptions can be found, such as the Russian Federation. Russia is allocated a very high 
political factor which is crucial for its rank (34) and France ranked as 15 has also the 
highest political factor. The same is true in the case of China which despite its high 
political engagement is ranked only 44. The mean unweighted Kearney index 
decomposed into sub-components by country are reported in Figure 1. Mean of all four 
indices by country are shown in Figure 2. The position of countries with the exception 
of the weighted principal component index is very similar. The difference in the latter is 
due to normalization prior to aggregation of the three principal components. The three 
principal components are shifted such that the minimum values are 0 and the sum of 
variances used as weights in the aggregation add up to 1.    
			
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The mean globalisation by regions is presented in Table 3B and Figure 4. The ranking 
of regions differs depending on whether identical or different weighting system for the 
Kearney index is applied, or whether only the first principal component or a weighted 
index is used. As a result of attaching a higher weight to the technology factor, sub-
Saharan Africa, with relative low technology component, switches its position in the 
favour of East Asia to a lower rank. Based on equal weights, the South Asian region is 
identified as the least globalised region. The low level of globalisation is very much 
determined by the absence of the technology factor. This picture is shared with the sub-
Saharan African region. The ranking based on the first principal component is similar to 
that of the Kearney-based weighted index.  
The Latin America and Middle East and North Africa regions are allocated a medium 
level of globalisation. However, they differ by index components. For instance, Latin 
America is advantageous in economic integration, while the Middle East and North 
Africa enjoy better personal contacts. In terms of political engagements they share, 
however, a very close position. The East Asian region shows a high economic 
integration and technology transfer, but its globalisation is limited by relatively low 
personal contacts and political engagements. The East European region shows progress 
in all four factors, but yet has low technology transfer. The West European9 and South 
East Asian regions take the positions of the highest globalised economic and geographic 
regions. The economic integration for the South East Asian region is higher, while the 
remaining three components are higher in West European. We find large heterogeneity 
in globalisation among countries belonging to these two regions.   
                                                           
9 In order to reduce the number of regions we have added Australia, Japan, USA, and Canada to the West 
European region. In continuation we use Western Europe and industrialized countries interchangeably. 
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The mean indices and their components for each year of observation from 1995 to 2000 
are reported in Table 3C and Figure 3 which is based on the unweighted Kearney index. 
Ideally this should be weighted by the countries’ share of GDP or population to provide 
a more accurate picture of the temporal changes in the global globalisation process. 
Despite the short period it yet provides a partial picture of the development of the 
globalisation index. In terms of total GDP produced, size of population and total trade 
the small sample of included countries provide a satisfactory coverage of globalisation.  
The unweighted economic integration increased during 1995 to 1997 from 0.73 to 0.86. 
It declined sharply to 0.60 in 1998 and remained below this level until 2000. The two 
principal component indices continuously increased over time. These are preferred as 
they are not restricted by assumption of the same weights or arbitrarily chosen weights. 
The technology component continuously increased from 0.27 to 0.44. The political 
component is constant over time and as expected it does not change over a short period. 
The average annual changes in index components and composite indices are reported in 
Table 3D. Here the changes are based on annual means neglecting the between country 
variation. The between country variation is quite high as a share of the total variation. 
Due to the increasing patterns of technology component and the principal component 
indices over time, their per cent changes over time are all positive.  

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A number of factors distinguish this study from previous ones. First, unlike previous 
studies based only on trade proxy globalisation, our analysis is based on a general index 
of globalisation covering various aspects of changes in international economy and in 
world politics. It captures the free movements of goods, services, technology, labour, 
capital and politics across borders and over time resulting from lower transportation 
cost, lower trade barriers, faster communication technologies, competition and 
standardizations. Second, the time period is very short and covers only the last years of 
the second wave of globalisation. Third, the number of countries is also limited by data 
availability.  
Despite the limitations in the form of country and time coverage, our results provide a 
clear picture of the heterogeneity in the process of globalisation over recent phase of 
globalisation, disparity in development and its impacts on rising inequality between and 
within countries and regions over time. Before turning to the regression analysis, we 
note that the results indicate that globalisation has reduced poverty through faster 
growth in several integrated economies. In our sample and period one can see a pattern 
that globalised countries experienced high growth and reduced poverty. However, 
inequality can be linked to poor governance, infrastructure and institutions, and taxes 
and redistribution policies in lagging countries rather than their fast growth and 
globalisation.   
 
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Income inequality from a country perspective may depend on a number of internal and 
external factors. Globalisation is one such main external factor. The link between 
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globalisation, income inequality and growth has for years been the focus of much 
researcher attention. However, with the exception of a partial view in studies like 
Mahler (2001) and Agénor  (2003) who looked at the relationship between inequality 
and the economic components (trade, FDI and financial openness) of globalisation, the 
lack of a globalisation index has not allowed statistical estimation and testing of the 
relationship. In this section we aim to address this by means of regression analysis: 
(3) 
 


     +++= ∑
=1
10 γαα  
where  and  refer to the Gini coefficient and globalisation index,  
is a  vector of regional dummies,  an error term and the subscript  refers to a country. 
Since the two datasets, Kearney and WIID, do not overlap we were forced as a second 
best alternative to use a cross sectional approach in establishing the relationship. The 
Kearney database covers the period 1995-2000, while the WIID covers the period 
before 1998. The former is a balanced panel data of 62 countries, while in the latter 146 
countries are observed non-consecutively on an irregular basis.  
The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income inequality. It is given as a mean of 
multiple observations for a given country in a given year. The multiplicity of 
observations is due to the different definitions of income, area coverage and units of 
measurement. It is defined here in two different ways. First, the most recent observation 
(1996 to 1998) is used in the cross sectional regression analysis. A number of countries 
(16) are observed prior to 1995. For the second definition instead of the last year of 
observation we use the mean Gini by country for all years that a country is observed. 
For summary statistics of the inequality variables see Table 1.  
The globalisation index is defined in four different ways: the unweighted and weighted 
Kearney and principal component indices. In the unweighted Kearney case all 13 
indicators are given identical weights (=1). In order to avoid the strong assumption of 
equal weights, in the weighted Kearney case a number of factors are given double 
weights (=2) on an ad hoc basis. The unequally weighted factors are foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, international telephone traffic and internet users. The 
unweighted principal component index is based on the first principal component of the 
same 13 indicators, while the weighted index is based on the weighted average of the 
first three principal components.  
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Correlation among the different unweighted components of the Kearney globalisation 
index, and different aggregate globalisation indices are reported in Table 4. Calculations 
here are based on cross-sectional data obtained as multiple periods means to be used in 
the regression analysis. The correlation coefficients and their significance are very 
similar to those based on non-averaged individual observation reported in Table 2. All 
coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero indicating positive within 
and between group correlation among the indices and their decomposition. An 
exception is insignificant correlation of the political component with economic and 
personal components. In general the correlation among the aggregate indices (0.82 to 
0.99) is stronger than correlation among the index components (0.35 to 0.65). The 
between group components correlation varies in the interval 0.33 to 0.85.     
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Correlation among the income inequality, poverty and globalisation indices, based on 
over time mean values, are also reported in Table 4. The two Gini coefficients are 
highly correlated with each other (0.84). They are negatively correlated (-0.22 to –0.37) 
with the personal, technology and political components, but uncorrelated with the 
economic component. The same negative relationship holds between inequality and the 
aggregate globalisation indices (-0.28 to -0.33).  
The poverty measures representing per cent of population below the national poverty 
line, below $1 and below $2 per day are positively correlated (0.45 to 0.83). However, 
none of these three poverty measures are correlated with the fourth measure based on 
the share of 20 per cent poorest of national income or consumption. The first three 
poverty measures are uncorrelated with inequality, while the last measure is negatively 
correlated (-0.76 to -0.85). Increased inequality is more disadvantageous to the poorest 
20 per cent of population. Concerning correlation between our four poverty measures 
and four globalisation indices, results show that globalisation reduces poverty (-0.31 to 
0.50) and increases (0.22 to 0.23) the poorest share of national income or consumption 
thereby also reducing inequality. The declining poverty is mostly associated with the 
technology component of globalisation. For more details see Table 4.   
"
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The estimation results from a regression of the Gini coefficient on the unweighted 
Kearney globalisation index, when Gini is defined as the most recent year of 
observation, are reported in Table 5A. Results based on an alternative definition where 
Gini is defined as mean income inequality over time are reported in Table 5B. 
Regression results from the two Gini measures on the unweighted (first) principal 
component measure of globalisation are presented in Table 5C. Results based on 
weighted first three principal components are not reported here due to limited spaces. 
It is worth mentioning that, since we use cross sectional regression analysis, it has not 
been possible to identify unobservable country specific effects. However, in addition to 
the globalisation index we have added a number of dummy variables representing 
unobservable regional effects. These capture regional heterogeneity in income 
inequality.  
For sensitivity analysis, a number of alternative specifications of the simple relationship 
(equation 3) are estimated. In the basic model in Table 5A (Model A1) variations in 
income inequality are explained by an aggregate unweighted Kearney globalisation 
index. The coefficient is negative and statistically highly significant. It indicates a 
negative relationship between the level of globalisation and income inequality. The 
same relationship applies when globalisation is differently weighted (Model A9). 
However, globalisation explains only 11 per cent of the variations in income inequality 
among the 60 countries.10 This is in line with Lindert and Williamson (2001) who found 
the net impact of globalisation too small to explain the long-term rise in world 
inequality. The inclusion of the squared globalisation indices in Models A1 and A9 
were insignificant indicating absence of Kuznets U-shaped relationship between 
inequality and globalisation. 
                                                           
10 The income inequality variable for South Africa and Morocco is missing. These two countries are 
excluded from the regression analysis.   
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Results from a decomposition of the unweighted Kearney globalisation index into its 
four sub-components (Model A2 to A5) show that economic integration and political 
engagement do not individually explain any of the variations in income inequality.11 
However, simultaneous inclusion of the four components (Model A6) indicates that 
personal contacts and technology transfers reduce inequality, while economic 
integration increases inequality. Political engagement is found to have no significant 
effect. Personal contact is the single component contributing most to the explanation of 
inequality variations. To control for regional heterogeneity we added a number of 
regional dummies. Accounting for regional heterogeneity (Model A7) captures most 
variations in inequality among the countries. The explanatory power of the model 
increases from 0.11 to 0.64. Similar results are obtained when the globalisation index is 
weighted (Model A10). However, the globalisation index turns out to be insignificant. It 
should be noted that there is a risk that regional inequality and globalisation are 
correlated biasing the effects of globalisation on income inequality. This applies as well 
to the case where both sub-components of globalisation and regional effects are 
included (Model A8).   
Regression results corresponding to Models A1 to A8, based on alternative definitions 
of income inequality, where mean Gini coefficient over time is used, are reported in 
Table 5B and labelled as Models B1 to B8. The signs of coefficients are not changed. 
However, their significance and sizes in a number of cases are changed. The regional 
variables play an even more important role in the explanation of variation in income 
inequality.  
In Table 5C we present regression results on the link between income inequality defined 
in two different ways and globalisation computed using the first principal component 
method. As in the previous cases the results indicate a negative relationship between 
globalisation and income inequality. The squared globalisation index is positive and 
weakly significant (Models C2 and C5) indicating a U-shaped or declining negative 
relationship. The fit of the model is somewhat lower compared to the two Kearney 
based indices. Adding regional dummies to the relation (Models C3 and C6) produces 
similar results in terms of signs, significance and the size of effects. Again the 
globalisation index turns out to be insignificant when regional dummies are added to the 
model.  
Our results are in line with Mahler (2001) who using Luxembourg Income Study data 
found little evidence of a systematic relationship between the three main modes of 
economic globalisation namely trade, outbound investment and financial openness and 
either the distribution of disposable personal income or earnings of households. The 
overall conclusion is that economic integration does not systematically lead to increased 
income inequality across entire economies.  
It is to be noted that the results presented here are primary tentative. The results provide 
some initial support to the hypothesis of the existence of a (negative) relationship 
between inequality and globalisation but several essential improvements are still 
necessary to confirm this finding.  
                                                           
11 Agénor (2003) found an inverted U-shape relationship between globalization and poverty. The index of 
globalization was based on trade and financial integration. The index is similar to our economic 
integration component.  
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The index should take an axiomatic approach that sets out its desirable properties and 
provide a family of indexes that fulfil such properties. The index should fully quantify 
globalisation by including several other relevant components. These could include some 
measure of cost-benefit ratio of globalisation, impacts on standards of living, 
environmental aspects, wage inequality, skill biased technological change, the volume 
and directions of foreign trade and movements of skilled labour, and democracy and 
conflict, shift in power and aspects of cultural uniformity.  
The direction of causality, simultaneity and bias due to omitted effects must be 
investigated. Non-linearity would also shed more light on the Kuznets inverted U-
hypothesis about the inequality-globalisation relationship conditional on growth. 
Industrialized countries dominate the current sample, with different relationships 
between development, redistribution and inequality than developing countries. The 
sample of countries should be expanded to include more developing and transition 
countries.  
An identification of major determinants of globalisation and quantification of their 
effects on the ranking of countries are key issues based on which policy options could 
be provided. Analysis will help in identifying ways for a fair treatment of products, 
services and people that enables poor countries to benefit from globalisation to a greater 
extent.  

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In several studies the relationship between globalisation and poverty is examined. 
Cornia and Court (2001) find that rising inequality threatens growth and poverty 
reduction targets and persistent poverty at high levels makes poverty reductions 
difficult. Results in Agénor (2003) suggest that at the low levels globalisation hurt the 
poor, but at higher levels it reduces poverty. Ravallion (2003) sees reducing inequalities 
in opportunities within the developing countries to be crucial to realize the poverty-
reducing potential of globalisation. Globalisation is one external factor that might affect 
the earnings, distribution of income and poverty. In this section we aim to address the 
link between globalisation and poverty by the means of regression analysis: 
(4) 
 


     !" +++= ∑
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10 ηλλ  
where  refer to globalisation index,  is a vector of regional dummies,   
an error term and the subscript  refers to a country.  
The poverty data are prepared by the World Bank’s Development Research Group 
(http://wwww.worldbank.org/) and Human Development Report 2003 (2003). The 
!" variable is defined in four different ways: per cent population below the 
national poverty line, per cent populations with income below $1.08 and $2.15 per day 
in 1993 international prices12, and share of the 20 per cent poorest of national income or 
                                                           
12 This is equivalent to $1 and $2 in 1985 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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consumption from 1990-2001. National estimates of poverty line are based on 
population weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.  
To conserve spaces, the globalisation index chosen is the unweighted Kearney index 
defined previously. Information on national poverty line is only available for 29 
developing and transition countries included in the globalisation database, and for 38 
countries we have information on the share of population with income below $1 and $2 
per day. The observation period covers mainly 1993-2000 with a few exceptions dating 
back to 1989. Information on share of the 20 per cent poorest of national 
income/consumption is available for 59 countries.13 The Bank does not provide data on 
poverty in industrialized countries. These are excluded from the poverty regression 
analysis.14  
"
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The estimation results from a regression of the poverty on the unweighted Kearney 
globalisation index are reported in Table 6. For sensitivity analysis, a number of 
alternative specifications of the relation in equation 4 are estimated. In the basic model 
(Model C1) variations in poverty are explained by the aggregate unweighted Kearney 
globalisation index. The coefficient is negative and statistically weakly significant. 
Globalisation at most explains only 9 per cent of the variations in poverty among the 
countries. It indicates a negative relationship between the level of globalisation and 
poverty at the national level. However, the relationship is not significantly different 
from zero when poverty is defined as income below $1 (Model C3) or $2 per day (C5). 
To control for regional heterogeneity we added a number of regional dummies. 
Accounting for regional heterogeneity (Models C2, C4, C6 and C8) captures most 
variations in poverty among the countries. The explanatory power of the models 
increases to up to 0.53 in Model C8.  
Again the results presented here must be interpreted with cautious. With the exception 
of Models C7 and C8, the sample is very small and the periods where poverty and 
globalisation are measured do not overlap in all cases. In Model C8 where the sample is 
largest (the regions of Middle East and North Africa, South East Asia, Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa) the poorest 20 per cent have a significantly lower share of 
income compared to the reference group, East Europe. The share among the East 
European countries is insignificantly different from that of the West Europeans 
indicating no link between globalisation and poverty when poverty for the poorest is 
defined as the share of national income and consumption. As mentioned previously, 
several factors limit comparability of this study with those found in the literature. The 
strength of the current study is computation of a multidimensional index of 
globalisation and the use of statistical methods to establish the relationship between 
globalisation, inequality and poverty conditional on regional location of countries. The 
main limitations are the short time period and small number of countries included in our 
regression analysis.  
 
                                                           
13 No data is available for Argentine, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. 
14 Alternatively one could assign the minimum poverty rate of 2 per cent to the industrialized countries 
and instead of least squares apply tobit analysis to the censored data to establish the link between poverty 
and globalization. 
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This study addresses the measurement of two indices of globalisation, Kearney and 
principal component analysis, that quantifies the level and development of globalisation 
to rank countries. The indices are composed of four main components: economic 
integration, personal contact, technology, and political engagements, each developing 
differently over time. Alternative weighted and unweighted versions of the two indices 
are also computed. 
The results show that internal and external conflicts seem to effectively reduce 
countries’ globalisation prospects. The low rank of countries is often associated with 
political and personal factors that several developing countries are unable to address. 
The high ranked countries share similar patterns in various component distributions. 
The mean globalisation by region shows that technology factors play an important role 
in the ranking of regions. This breakdown of the index into major components provides 
possibilities to identify sources of globalisation and associate it with economic policy 
measures to bring about desirable changes in national and international policies.  
When looking at the simple correlation among the income inequality, poverty and 
globalisation indices, we find the Gini coefficients negatively correlated with 
disaggregated personal, technology and political components, but uncorrelated with the 
economic component. The same negative relationship holds between income inequality 
and the aggregate globalisation indices. We do not find correlation between the share of 
poor and inequality, but their share of income is negatively correlated with income 
inequality. This is interpreted as increased inequality being more disadvantages to the 
poorest population. Concerning correlation between poverty and globalisation indices, 
results show that globalisation reduces poverty and increases the poorest share of 
income, thereby reducing inequality. The reduction in poverty is mostly associated with 
technology component of globalisation.  
In a regression analysis we investigate the relationship between inequality, poverty and 
globalisation. Results show that the globalisation index explains only 7-11 per cent of 
the variations in income inequality, and 9 per cent of poverty among the countries. By 
decomposing the aggregate globalisation index into four components, results show that 
personal contacts and technology transfers reduce inequality, while economic 
integration increases inequality. Political engagement is found to have no significant 
effects on income inequality. Economic globalisation component increases poverty, 
while personal contact reduces poverty. When controlling for regional heterogeneity, we 
find that the regional variable plays an important role in the explanation of a variation in 
inequality and poverty, which makes the globalisation coefficient insignificant.  
Although the current version of the index quantifies the level of globalisation well, it 
has certain limitations and the results should be interpreted with caution. We have 
addressed a number of extensions to overcome several of the shortcomings. These 
concern an axiomatic approach to set out the desirable properties of the index, the use of 
panel data, identification and incorporation of more dimensions or components and the 
use of estimation methods that avoid the choice of weights attached to each index 
component on an ad hoc basis. These are important issues in understanding how 
globalisation functions and how to use the generated information in policy formulation 
and development evaluations. The index is in an early stage of development but has 
identified several directions along which future advances can be made. In order to make 
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the regression results on the link between globalisation, inequality and poverty more 
stable and to cover different phases of globalisation one should extend the data both in 
time and country dimensions.  

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Table 1. Summary statistics, globalisation data, 1995-2000, NT=62x6=372 observations 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
A. Economic integration 
1. Trade (w=1)  0.777  0.6750  0.505  0.157  3.475 
2. Foreign direct investment (=2)  0.043  0.0285  0.050  0.000  0.331 
3. Portfolio investment (=2)  0.057  0.0229  0.150  0.000  1.669 
4. Income payments and receipts (w=1) 0.090  0.0604  0.099  0.005  0.782 
 
B. Personal contacts 
1. International telephone traffic (=2) 97.432  44.245  128.910  0.900  707.460 
2. International travel & tourism (=1) 0.806  0.348  1.056  0.003  6.361 
3. Transfer payments & receipts (=1)  0.033  0.027  0.030  0.000  0.150 
 
C. Technology 
1. Internet users (=2)  0.064  0.018  0.101  0.000  0.594 
2. Internet hosts (=1)  0.013  0.002  0.027  0.000  0.295 
3. Secure internet servers (=1)  0.011 0.001  0.029  0.000  0.283 
 
D. Political engagements 
1. Embassies in country (=1)  71.613  68.500  34.197  13.000  172.000 
2. Membership in intl org. (=1)  48.806  47.800  10.382  6.000  77.000 
3. Particip. in UN SC missions (=1)   0.251  0.222  0.205  0.000  0.778 
 
E. Income inequality measures (n1=n2==60): 
1. Gini from most recent year  38.349  36.670  9.218  23.702  59.000  
2. Mean multiple period Gini  38.342  36.580  9.326  21.990  60.690 
 
F. Poverty measures (n1=29, n2=n3=38 and n4=59): 
1. % population below poverty line  28.348  28.600  14.281  4.600 64.000 
2. % population below $1 per day  12.826  6.350  18.269  2.000  82.200 
3. % population below $2 per day  31.853  24.050  27.997  2.000  96.400 
4. Share of 20% poorest of national  6.583  6.900  2.219  1.400  10.600   
    income and consumption 
 
G. Kearney globalisation indices: 
1. Unweighted Kearney index (K) 2.980  2.437  1.420  1.069  7.978 
2. Weighted Kearney index  (KW) 3.646  2.825  2.035  1.168  11.055 
H. Principal component globalisation indices: 
1. First principal component (PC1) 1.029  0.598  1.000  0.000  6.279 
2. Second principal component  4.279  4.375  1.000  0.000  8.832 
3. Third principal component  6.810  6.853  1.000  0.000  10.530 
4. Weighted first three PC (PCW) index 2.945  2.808 0.636  1.613  5.238  
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: w = weights.  
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Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients, NT = 372. 
               year  econom  person  techno  politi     K      KW      PC1    PCW 
 
Year         1.0000   
 
Economic    -0.1380  1.0000   
             0.0076  
 
Personal     0.0399  0.5871  1.0000   
             0.4423  0.0001     
 
Technology   0.1150  0.2906  0.3446  1.0000    
             0.0265  0.0001  0.0001   
 
Political    0.0046  0.0312  0.0243  0.3952  1.0000   
             0.9282  0.5475  0.6403  0.0001      
 
K            0.0010  0.7119  0.6840  0.7576  0.5523  1.0000    
             0.9832  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001     
 
KW          -0.0082  0.7630  0.6863  0.7550  0.4738  0.9909  1.0000 
             0.8746  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
 
PC1          0.2946  0.6395  0.6327  0.7127  0.3947  0.8774  0.8842  1.0000  
             0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
 
PCW          0.2314  0.3759  0.3313  0.6712  0.7975  0.8156  0.7840  0.8392  1.0000  
             0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  
  
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: K=Unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component  
            index, PCW=weighted principal component index based the first three principal components.  
            p-values are given under the coefficients. 
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Table 3A. Globalisation index by country, ranked by the first principal component (PC1). 
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Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: K=Unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component  
            index, PCW=weighted principal component index based the first three principal components.  Gini and mgini  
            are the recent period and mean multiple period Gini coefficients. Rank1 and Rnk2 are rank orders by PC1  
            and KW. 
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Table 3B. Globalisation index by region, ranked in descending order of first principal component index, 
NT=372. 
Region  Economic    Personal   Technol.   Political    K  KW  PC1  PCW 
West Europe1  0.947   0.806   0.921   1.824   4.497   5.778  1.945  3.628 
South East Asia  1.158   0.511   0.221   1.076   2.966   3.763  1.149  2.724 
East Europe  0.539   0.549   0.159   1.218   2.465   2.887  0.770  2.712 
Middle E&N Africa   0.374   0.640   0.099   1.198   2.311   2.564  0.460  2.558 
Latin America  0.645    0.161   0.049   1.188   2.043   2.464  0.590  2.760 
East Asia  0.467   0.225   0.253   0.881   1.826   2.321  0.451  2.429 
sub-Saharan Africa   0.450   0.572  0.028   1.076   2.127   2.318  0.359  2.396 
South Asia   0.184   0.331   0.003   1.351   1.868   1.941  0.246  2.585 
Note 1 Equivalent of industrialised countries. It includes West Europe and Australia, Japan, USA and Canada. 
 
 
Table 3C. Development of globalisation index over time, NT=372. 
Year  Economic   Personal   Technol.  Political   K   KW  PC1  PCW 
1995   0.726   0.522    0.266   1.380   2.893   3.546 0.689  2.767 
1996   0.760   0.576   0.316   1.374   3.026   3.725  0.749  2.815 
1997   0.861   0.522   0.349   1.359   3.091   3.841 0.872  2.869 
1998   0.595   0.543   0.404   1.388   2.929   3.553  1.050  2.945 
1999   0.545   0.612   0.441   1.380   2.978   3.595  1.264  3.079 
2000   0.577   0.566   0.438   1.381   2.961   3.614  1.550  3.179 
 
 
Table 3D. Percentage change in globalisation index over time, NT=372. 
Year  Economic    Personal   Technol.   Political   K  KW PC1  PCW 
1995/1996  10.07   18.80   63.45   -0.02   5.43  6.15  8.56  1.73 
1996/1997  16.93   -8.05   31.21   -0.33   2.53  3.77  22.85  1.88 
1997/1998   -28.19  3.27  55.97   2.20  -5.23   -7.17  18.18  2.40 
1998/1999  -9.41  16.96   52.00    0.67  1.82  0.80  16.94  4.14 
1999/2000   9.06   -6.79   29.17   0.62  -0.55  0.41  21.32  3.32 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: K=Unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component  
            index, PCW=weighted principal component index based the first three principal components.  
 
  
 28
Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients, N=60. 
             Econom  Person  Techno  Politi       K      KW      PC1     PCW    gini   mgini   PBPL    PB$1    PB$2    IS20 
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Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: p-values are given under the coefficients. K and KW are unweighted and weighted Kearney globalisation indices. The PC1 and PCW are the unweighted (first) and weighted  
           (first three) principal component globalisation indices. Gini and mgini are the recent period and mean multiple period Gini coefficients. PBPL is per cent population below  
           national poverty line, PB$1 is per cent population below $1 per day, , PB$1 is per cent population below $2 per day, and IS20 is share of 20 per cent poorest of national  
           income or consumption. 
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Table 5A. LS parameter estimates of the impact of the Kearney globalisation index on most recent years of income inequality (gini). 
 Unweighted Kearney globalisation index (K) Weighted Kearney (KW)  
Explanatory variables Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 Model A7 Model A8 Model A9 Model A10 
Intercept 45.8642 a 37.5410 a 34.2443 a 34.9793 a 38.4699 a 33.4670 a 34.1586 a 32.4668 a 45.2898 a 39.4501 a 
Log K globalisation index -7.4923 a     -  -0.6478  . - - - 
Log KW globalisation index      - - - -6.9937 a -3.4690  . 
Log economic integration  -1.2966 .    3.7486 b - 2.1313  . - - 
Log personal contact   -4.2817 a   -4.5780 a - -3.3735 a - - 
Log technology    -1.3914 a  -1.2066 b - 0.9879  c - - 
Log political engagement     -0.6328 . -0.4883  . - 0.3044  . - - 
Middle East & North Africa      - 4.6848  . 9.3241 a - 3.4092  . 
East Asia      -  0.7517  . 0.1785  . - -5.8351  . 
South East Asia      - 8.7789 a 8.5782 a - 7.5161 b 
South Asia      - 2.7820  . 8.1049 b - 0.8502  . 
Latin America      - 18.5843 a 17.5835 a - 13.2485 a 
sub-Saharan Africa      - 15.1725 a 21.0475 a - 12.7544 a 
East Europe      - -3.1218  . -1.0605  . - -9.1353 a 
Indust. countries (reference)      - - - - - 
           
R-square adjusted 0.1119 -0.0068 0.1804 0.0998 -0.0145  0.2274 0.6381 0.6834 0.0952 0.6870 
F-value 8.4300 a 0.6000 . 13.9800 a 7.5400 a 0.1500 . 5.3400 a 14.000 a 12.5800 a 7.2000 a 17.1900 a 
RMSE 8.6873 9.2495 8.3457 8.7460 9.2851 8.1027 5.5458 5.1870 8.7734 5.1599 
Number of observations 60 60 60 60 60 69 60 60 60 60 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: Significant at less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and greater than 10%(.) level of significance. The square of weighted and unweighted Kearney globalisation indices in  
            Models A1 and A9 are insignificant indicating absence of U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalisation. RMSE is root mean square error. 
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